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Rising female labor force participation and recent changes to the welfare system have
increased the importance of child care for all women and, particularly, the less-skilled. This paper
focuses on the child care decisions of women who differ by their skill level and the role that costs
play in their work decision. After reviewing government child-care programs targeted at less-skilled
women, we present a descriptive analysis of current utilization and child care costs. We emphasize
differences across skill groups, showing that the least-skilled women both use less costly paid care
and are more likely to use unpaid care. We then survey the existing evidence regarding the
responsiveness of female labor supply to child care costs, reviewing both econometric studies and
demonstration projects that include child care components. To investigate variation in the response
to child care cost across skill levels, we implement models similar to this past literature. We
conclude that while the overall elasticity of labor force participation with respect to the market price
of child care is between -0.05 and -0.35, this elasticity is larger for the least skilled women and
declines with skill. Throughout the paper, we reflect upon the implications of our analysis for
welfare reform.
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The employment of mothers with small children has exploded over the past few decades,
outpacing the growth among any other large demographic group. In 1947, only 12 percent of
women with children under the age of six were in the workforce, but that level jumped to 32
percent by 1970 and 62 percent by 1996. An obvious implication of the increased labor force
activity of women is the concomitant increase in the importance of the market for child care.
An inclusive economic analysis of the child care market and public policies directed
towards it would address at least three central research questions:' (1) how responsive is the
demand for child care and labor supply decisions to the cost of care; (2) how do differences in the
quality of child care services affect the demand for child care services and children's
development, and (3) are there imperfections in the market for child care that can justify
government intervention. But recent changes in public policy place heightened importance on
answering the first question. Welfare reform legislation enacted in 1996 includes lifetime limits
on benefit receipt and sets goals for the states to move recipients into employment. An important
constraint in meeting these goals and moving welfare recipients into the labor market is the cost
and availability of child care. Additional federal funds have been allocated for child care
subsidies, but it is unclear whether the increase in spending is big enough to sufficiently alleviate
this constraint.
Although a significant literature exists examining the role of child care costs in the labor
supply decision of women, much less attention has been focused explicitly on those with less-
Hofferth (1991) and Council of Economic Advisers (1997) for a broad discussion of important issues in the
analysis of child care markets. For the most part, research has addressed quality separately from the impact of child
care costs on the quantity of child care purchased, although Blau and Hagy (1998) is an important exception.
1skill, who will disproportionally be affected by welfare reform. Yet the obstacle imposed by
child care costs is not uniform for all women; those high-skilled women with high potential
market wages can clear that hurdle more easily than the less-skilled. For the less-skilled, the lack
of low cost child care may be a crucial determinant of their own employment decisions. Their
lower earnings capacity may make home production a more attractive option than employment in
the formal labor market. Alternatively, the lower levels of income for the less-skilled may force
them into the labor market regardless of relatively small differences in the cost. Therefore, one
may not expect a uniform response to changes in child care costs across the skill distribution.
This paper will focus on the child care decisions of women who differ by their level of
skill, as measured by their level of education, and the role that costs play in determining their
labor force participation. Our analysis will include four separate components. First, we will
review the institutional background of the market for child care, focusing mainly on the
government programs targeted at less-skilled women. Second, we will conduct a descriptive
analysis of the utilization and cost of child care services, paying particular attention to differences
that exist among women with different levels of skill. Third, we will survey the existing
evidence regarding the responsiveness of female labor supply to child care costs, reviewing both
econometric studies and the results of several demonstration projects that include child care
components. Finally, since the econometric studies do not focus on less-skilled women, and the
responses to child care incentives from demonstration projects are difficult to interpret, we
conduct our own econometric analysis. In this analysis we focus not only on variation in the
response to child care cost across skill levels, but also on reconciling some of the differences in
2the literature. Throughout the paper, where appropriate we will reflect upon the implications of
our analysis for welfare reform.
In the descriptive section, we show that the least skilled women are less likely to use paid
care overall and to pay less for that care, although this represents a larger fraction of family
income. These women are much more likely to use relative care than other women, but are more
likely to pay for this type of care. From our econometric analysis, we conclude that for women
with children under 13, the elasticity of labor force participation is between -0.05 and -0.35. We
also establish that this elasticity is larger for less-skilled workers and declines with skill. This
relationship holds not only for all women with children under 13, but also within subgroups
defined by marital status, age of youngest child and family poverty status. Even though the
effects of subsidizing child care are thus predicted to be largest for the least skilled, levels of
employment for women in these groups are likely to remain far below those of other groups of
women, even if substantial subsidies were available.
II. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
The past two decades or so has seen a significant increase in federal policy designed to
help defray the costs of child care. Over this period, a number of different policies have been
introduced and modified, many of which are targeted at women in low-income households. New
policies and modifications of existing policies frequently coincided with reforms to the national
welfare system. This section will describe the development of these policies.2
2Thjs discussion is based mainly on information available in The Green Book (U.S. House of Representatives,
1996, 1998)
3The longest running of these programs, Head Start enacted in 1965, created subsidized
child care as a side effect of a policy designed to improve the development of low-income
children. Head Start is a classroom-based program for pre-school children from low-income
families that is intended to provide the necessary skills for them to succeed when they enter
elementary school. Because the program takes young children out of their homes during the
program's hours of operation (typically a few hours in the morning), however, it effectively acts a
subsidized child care program. Since the daily program only lasts a few hours, mothers would
still be required to find additional child care to accept anything other than short part-time jobs.
Nevertheless, it lessens the need for extensive child care services and may, for instance, facilitate
the provision of child care by a family member or friend who may only need to fill-in for a few
hours rather than the whole day. Additionally, some programs coordinate with local day care
providers. In fiscal year 1997, Head Start expenditures totaled almost $4 billion.
Among programs currently in existence that are targeted specifically at child care, the
Child Care Tax Credit (CCTC) has been in place the longest. The CCTC was instituted in 1976
as a replacement for an earlier tax deduction policy; it currently provides a nonrefundable tax
credit of up to $4,800 for households with two or more children in which expenditures on child
care are required to enable the individual to work. Families with $10,000 in annual income or
less are allowed to take a credit of 30 percent of their expenses and the credit rate falls gradually
to 20 percent for families with $30,000 in annual income or more. Although the statutory
provisions seem to favor low income households, the fact that the credit is nonrefundable
significantly limits its value to those at the bottom of the income distribution. Figure 1 presents
evidence to that effect, displaying the percentage of families with children that took advantage of
4the credit in 1994, by level of income.3 It shows that the credit is utilized most extensively by
families in the middle to upper parts, but not the very top, of the income distribution. The cost of
the tax credit in that year was $2.5 billion.
In 1988, two major new programs were initiated through the Family Support Act (FSA)
that provided direct expenditures on child care for low-income households. That law required
that all recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the main cash transfer
component of the welfare system at the time, with children age three and over with guaranteed
child care be required to participate in some work-related activity through the JOBS (Job
Opportunities and Basic Skills) program. The FSA also instituted another child care program,
called Transitional Child Care, which covered former AFDC recipients for one year after leaving
welfare for work. The federal government shared the cost of providing the child care for these
programs with the states. In the 1996 fiscal year, the last year of these programs, the federal
government's share of these costs was just over $1 billion.
Two additional programs were instituted in 1990, the Child and Dependent Care Block
Grant (CDCBG) and the At-Risk Child Care Program. In the former, block grants were awarded
to states on a matching basis and states were required to spend those funds to provide child care
services to low-income families. This program cost the federal government $935 million in
1996. The latter program was designed to provide funds to states to identify and provide
subsidies to those individuals who are "at-risk" of requiring the assistance of the welfare system
3me source of these data is US Department of Treasury (1997). Gentry and Hagy (1996) present similar
information for 1989.
5because child care constraints are limiting their ability to work. Its cost was $291 million in
1996.
Welfare reform legislation enacted in 1996 considerably simplified this web of programs
providing subsidized child care for different categories of low-income families. It eliminated the
child care expenditures associated with the AFDC/JOBS program, Transitional Child Care and
At-Risk Child Care and broadened the existing block grant to incorporate these other programs.
The new block grant is now called the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) and $2.8
billion was made available in 1997 for this program. Although the CCDF was designed to
simplify the system of providing child care subsidies at the federal level, there still remains a
separate federal block grant, funded under Title XX of the Social Security Act,which can be
used to fund child care. Under this program, about $2.5 billion was spent in 1997 for social
services of all kinds, with about 15 percent spent on day care services in particular.
Total federal spending on child care programs targeted at the welfare population has risen
dramatically over the past decade. As shown in Figure 2, the rise has been continuous with a
noticeable increase at the time welfare reform legislation went into effect. At the beginning of
the decade, about $1.25 billion was spent on AFDC child care, Transitional Child Care, the
CDCBG, and At-Risk Child Care. This level increased by about $1 billion through 1996 before
jumping another $700 million in 1997 when these programs were combined into the CCDF. By
2,002 spending on this new program is scheduled to increase to almost $4 billion, tripling in just
over a decade.
States also play a role in the provision of child care services beyond providing the
matching funds required by some federal programs. Many states undertake their own tax and
6subsidy programs. In 1994, for example, 23 states provided a tax subsidyfor child care costs,
which Stoney and Greenberg (1996) have estimated to be worth between $175 and$350 million.
Similarly, they note that studies suggest that up to $1.2 billion mayhave been spent in fiscal year
1990 on state child care initiatives, although some of this money was likelyobtained from federal
sources. A major role of state and local governments is inthe regulation of child care quality,
mostly in family- or center-based care. States typically addresssuch issues as caregiver
qualifications, protective features (such as immunization requirements), groupsize and
staff/child ratios, and other general features. Although issues of child care quality are extremely
important in the market of child care, they are beyond the scopeof this paper and we do not
address them here.
III. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF UTILIZATION AND COST
In order to analyze differences across skill level in the utilization and costof child care,
we use data from four panels of the Survey of Income and ProgramParticipation (SIPP). A full
set of child care questions were asked during Wave 3 of the 1990, 1991and 1993 panels,
covering the use of care during the Fall of that year. While the questions coverall children up to
age 14, we limit our sample to womenwith children under the age of 13. The 1992 panel asked
these questions during Wave 6, which also covers the fall of 1993. Thus, our datareflect
conditions in the Fall of 1990, 1991 and 1993. Throughout the empirical section, we use
4As is done for Census publications, weights in the 1992 and 1993 panels are scaled so that the pooled data properly
reflect the fall 1993 population.
5Hofferth (1996) provides a summary of the overall utilization and cost of child care from 1965-1993.
7education to proxy for skill level.6 Table 1, then, presents information on the fraction of families
using child care that pay for that care, and for these families the amount paid relative to family
income, separately by mother's education and marital status.
Looking first at all families with at least one child under 13, about 38 percent used some
type of paid child care. Of these, the average amount paid per week was $63, or 7 percent of
family income, but clear differences across skill levels are apparent.7 Compared to the most
skilled mothers (those with education beyond high school), the least skilled mothers (those not
finishing high school) are both less likely to pay for care and to pay less in absolute terms when
they do pay. Just under 30 percent of the least skilled pay for care, while almost 43 percent of
the most skilled do. The differences in the cost of care are most apparent for the highest skilled,
who pay about $69 per week, compared to $56or$57forthe medium and low-skilled mothers,
respectively. However, the least skilled pay a higher proportion of their income, 10.4 percent
compared to just 7.5and6.5percentfor the higher skilled groups. Given the differences in the
proportions paying for care, there is very little difference in the share of each group's total
income (for payers and non-payers) spent on child care, at about 3 percent for each group.8
6We split the sample into three groups, those with less than a high school education, high school graduates and those
with more than a high school degree. The overall numbers of women in these last two groups are about equal and
provide reasonable sample sizes for the econometric analysis which follows. To maintain consistency, we do not
separate out college graduates for the descriptive analysis, even though differences in labor force participation lead
to quite different sample sizes here.
7One may think that the share of the mother's earnings, rather than family income, that goes to child care is the
appropriate measure because it better reflects the extent to which these costs reduce the returns to work. However,
family well-being is better reflected by the income share measure. For this reason, and for the purposes of
consistency with previous work, we present costs as a percentage of income. Patterns across groups of costs as a
share of earnings are qualitatively similar to those reported here.
8This is calculated as the percent paying for care multiplied by the percent of income paid.
8A similar pattern appears when looking only at those with at least one child under 6.
Within this population, unmarried mothers with less than a high school degree may provide a
relevant comparison group for those eligible for welfare. Across marital status groups, only 44
percent of mothers with less than a high school degree whose youngest child is under 6 pay for
care, while 61 percent of those with more than a high school degree pay. The high skill group
consistently pays more for care, but again, as a fraction of income the cost falls with skill level,
from 10.9 percent to 8.2 percent to 7.2 percent. These same patterns are apparent for both
married mothers and unmarried mothers and the fractions paying for care are also fairly similar.
The most notable difference across marital status is that child care costs as a share of family
income are almost twice as large for unmarried mothers. This difference is clear in Figure 3
which presents costs as a share of family income for mothers with children under 6, by mother's
education, highlighting the main findings of Table 1.
Differences across skill groups such as these are likely to represent diversity in the
choices made regarding the type of child care used. Thus, Table 2 presents the distribution of
primary type of child care utilized for each child, by mother's education and marital status. Note
that the unit of observation here is the child, unlike in Table 1 where the family was the unit of
observation. Looking first at all children under 13, it is clear that school (including nursery
school and school-based activities) is a major source of child care. For children under six,
however, it is utilized to a far less extent. Focusing on the younger children, the most noticeable
difference is that children of less-skilled mothers are over twice as likely to be cared for by a
relative than are the children of the most-skilled mothers. Almost 38 percent of all children
under six in care whose mothers have less than a high school degree are cared for by relatives,
9compared to only 24 percent and 17 percent of those whose mothers have a high school degree
and more than a high school degree, respectively. Looking across marital status groups, it is not
surprising to see that children of unmarried women are very unlikely to be cared for by their
other parent.9 However, other relatives are much more likely to provide care, so that the use of
school, organized facilities and family-based care are fairly similar for children of married and
unmarried women. However, children of the least-skilled unmarried mothers are a bit more
likely to be in organized day care.
Table 3 shows, by type of care, the fraction of children whose families pay for that child's
care and the average amount spent per week for it, by mother's education and marital status.'°
Because most children between ages six and twelve are in school and do not pay for it, we again
focus on the child care arrangements for those under age 6. Most children in non-relative, non-
school care are in paid care. Over 90 percent of mothers whose children are in family or
organized day care facilities pay for the service. These percentages, along with the amount paid
for those paying, increase with the level of skill. The majority of children in school-based
settings or those being cared for by relatives receive care at no cost. For those in school,
however, only 19 percent of children of less-skilled mothers pay for care, compared to 46 percent
of children of more skilled mothers. Children of more-skilled mothers also attend more
expensive schools. Interestingly, the least-skilled mothers are more likely to pay for relative care
than are more-skilled mothers. Because of their greater use of relatives' services in this regard,
9Since the majority of children age 6 to 12 are in school, we present the marital status breakdown for children under
6 only.
10Since parent care is defined by the survey to be unpaid, and since very few children use in-home care or other
arrangements, these categories are not reported.
10these women may only be able to recruit more of them at a price. Looking across marital status
groups, younger children of unmarried mothers using organized and family day care are less
likely to be in paid care. This discrepancy by marital status is most noticeable for the least
skilled, and most likely reflects the fact that the majority of child care programs are associated
with the welfare system. Hence, unmarried mothers are much more likely to have access to free
care than are married mothers.
Figure 4 uses the findings for children under 6 to illustrate the highlights of Tables 2 and
3. Each bar represents the percent of children in the given type of care, while the shaded portion
of the bar represents those paying for that care. The average amount paid is shown at the top of
the bar.
Overall, then, it is clear that there are consistent differences across skill level in the
utilization and cost of child care. Most notable in terms of utilization is that the use of relative
care drops sharply with mother's education. Interestingly, there are very few differences in
utilization across marital status, other than other relatives substituting for fathers as caregivers for
children of unmarried mothers. Most notable in terms of costs is that the amount paid tends to
increase with skill, but that given the income disparities across groups, a much larger fraction of
income is spent by the low-skill mothers who pay for care. Due to the much lower incomes of
families headed by a single mother, the fraction of family income spent on child care is much
larger for unmarried mothers. Finally, for all groups the probability of paying for care generally
rises with skill, with the notable exception being relative care, where it drops.
What do these results tell us regarding the potential usage of day care services by the
additional million or so mothers with children under 6 who may enter the labor market as a result
11of welfare reform? One source of information is the decisions made bywelfare recipients in the
past. Within our sample from the SIPP are553 welfare recipients with children under 6 who are
using child care. While these sample sizes are toosmall to reliably investigate the types of care
used, we can calculate that 36.7 percent of these AFDCmothers with children under 6 pay for
care, and those paying spend an averageof $57 per week But historically most welfare recipients
did not work (perhaps because of child care constraints) and thosewho did may not be
representative of those who will be forced to enter thelabor market following welfare reform.
An alternative reference group is all single mothers with childrenunder age 6 who have dropped
out of high school. For these women, as was seen inTable 1, a slightly higher fraction use paid
care, at 41.8 percent. Weekly costs are fairlysimilar for this group and the AFDC group, at $59.
We can use these statistics to conduct back-of-the-envelopcalculations regarding the cost
that would be required to provide fully subsidized day care for these onemillion women,
assuming that there is an unlimited supply of the typeof care currently used." If only 41.8
percent of these women required paid care to enterthe labor market, as their reference group
does, we would expect the total cost to equal $1.28billion per year (1 million times $59*52 per
year times 41.8 percent using paid care).Realistically, however, more of the women who would
otherwise turn to welfare will likely require paid care than this reference groupbecause if free
care were available through, say, a relative, theywould have been more likely to utilize those
services already. Alternatively, then, one could provide an upperbound on the cost by assuming
that all will use paid care. In that case, the additional cost to provide fullysubsidized day care for
11These estimates are likely to be understated because they assume unlimited availability of the typesof care
currently used by unmarried, low-skill mothers at the current market price.As more mothers demand these services,
their cost may rise.
12each of the one million women would be $3.08 billion per year. These estimates compare to an
increase in federal funding brought about by welfare reform of $4 billion over 6 years, or about
$667 million per year. Thus, the currently planned increase in federal spending could provide a
subsidy of between 22 and 52percentfor each of the women likely to enter the labor market due
to welfare reform.
IV. EXISTING EVIDENCE ON CHILD CARE COSTS AND EMPLOYMENT
The existing evidence on the impact of child care costs on the employment decisions of
women comes mainly from econometric studies using non-experimental data, although a few do
take a "natural experiment" approach to the issue. Another potential source of information is
from government-sponsored demonstration projects. Many of the pilot welfare-to-work
programs included a child care component, implying that evaluation of the outcomes of these
projects may be able to shed light on the role of child care in the employment decision of poor
women. This section of the paper will review the research that has been completed in both of
these broad categories, beginning with the demonstration projects.
Evidence obtained from Demonstration Projects
Government-sponsored demonstration projects often offer considerable advantages in
examining the impact of alternative policies on individual behavior. Those that are well-
designed require a sample of individuals eligible for a particular program to be randomized into
treatment and control groups that should be comparable on any (observable or unobservable)
dimension. Those in the treatment group receive the benefits/pay the costs of the relevant policy
13and those in the control group face an environment which is no different than what they would
ordinarily experience. A simple comparison of the aggregate behavior of members of the
treatment and control groups will then identify the impact of the policy.
Policies that reduce or eliminate the cost of child care have been included in a number of
recent demonstration projects targeted at improving the labor market performance of different
subgroups of less-skilled workers. These projects are summarized in Table 4, which categorizes
them according to both the policy initiatives that instigated the demonstration and the target
population. Many of the demonstrations began as evaluations of early welfare reform policies
like the "JOBS" (Job Opportunities and Basic Skills) program initiated under the 1988 Family
Support Act and federal waivers granted to states to introduce alternative welfare policies under
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) system. They all include a large array of
financial incentives and participation requirements in addition to enhanced services, including
child care. Because so many different policies are incorporated into the treatment, it would be
difficult to quantify the specific role that the child care component played if large employment
gains are observed.'2 On the other hand, if little or no increases in employment are observed, one
'2To our knowledge, the only large scale randomized trial in which the treatment consisted solely of changes in child
care costs, was conducted in conjunction with the Gary Income Maintenance Experiment in the 1970s. The results
of this study were largely inconclusive because of small sample sizes and very low take-up rates of the subsidy
among treatment group members (Behrens, 1978). Regardless of the results, it is difficult to assess the relevance of
an experiment regarding female labor force participation from so long ago when such a smaller share of the female
population worked. The only other large scale randomized trial that has ever been planned was the Expanded Child
Care Options (ECCO) Demonstration in New Jersey. It had been on the drawing board for several years (Gueron
and Pauly, 1991), but unfortunately was never conducted.
14may reasonably conclude that the provision of additional child care services probably did little to
improve the labor market success of these women.'3
Results from the different demonstrations are somewhat mixed, depending upon the
target population and the services/incentives provided. Those demonstrations conducted in
conjunction with the JOBS program and with state waiver policies generally did increase
employment levels of the welfare population. Although some of the employment gains were
impressive in percentage terms, the absolute gain in employment rates was typically quite small.
For instance, in the third year of the California GAIN demonstration, 40 percent of the treatment
group worked at some point during the year compared to 34 percent for the control group -about
an 18 percent increase in employment rates. With a moderate employment effect such as this,
and the large array of other components of the treatments, it seems unlikely that child care played
a very large role in increasing employment.'4 Moreover, in the evaluations targeted at teen
mothers that included child care assistance, little success in improving employment rates was
observed. Although the confluence of services, mandates, and incentives in these demonstrations
suggests caution is required in interpreting their results, based on this evidence it seems
reasonable to conclude that subsidized child care may have a modest effect, at best, in increasing
employment levels of very low-skilled, single mothers with small children.
13An important caveat before drawing such a conclusion is that it is difficult to ascertain the value of the child care
component of these treatments. Although members of the control group were not eligible for the special child care
services offered to members of the treatment group, they were still eligible for any ongoing programs through which
they would normally be eligible to receive child care assistance. Therefore, if no treatment effect is observed, one
may alternatively conclude that the benefits provided to mothers in the treatment group were not significantly greater
than those offered to members of the control group.
if the observed increase in participation could be attributed solely to the child care treatment, the effect
of subsidized care would be considered relatively large.
15Econometric Evidence
A substantial body of research has used data generated in a non-experimental setting
along with econometric techniques to explore the relationship between child care costs and
female labor supply. The existing literature has employed many different methodologies, data
sets, and sample restrictions, so it is perhaps not surprising that the range of estimates of the
elasticity of employment to child care costs is reasonably large. In this review we present a
summary (that is not intended to be exhaustive) of the econometric evidence that has been
gathered to date, which focuses narrowly on this one important issue in the child care market.
One useful way to categorize these studies is to consider the source of the variability in
child care costs and the methodological approach taken to study the impact of that variability on
employment decisions. Table 5summarizesselected previous research in this maimer. The most
common approach uses the variation that exists in child care costs across individuals. These
costs vary because of things like the type of care utilized and regional differences in day care
costs. Some studies also rely on differences in the tax treatment of child care expenditures that
vary nonlinearly with family income.
Most of these papers employ a similar methodology. A probit model is estimated on the
discrete employment decision and the key covariates are the wage rate and child care costs.
Because both of these variables are only observed for those women who have chosen to work,
predicted values obtained from regression models for employed women and those who use paid
child care are used instead. Corrections are made for the potential sample selection bias that may
result from estimating these prediction equations on only these subsets of women.
16Other methodological approaches are also utilized that take advantage of individual
variation in child care costs. Michalopoulos, et al. (1992) and Ribar (1995), for instance,
formulate a complete structural model based on utility maximizing behavior and specific
functional form assumptions and estimate the parameters of the model. Averett, et al. (1997)
applies the approach introduced by Hausman (1981) for incorporating the nonlinearities of the
budget constraint faced by individuals because of the specific features of the tax system. In their
case, they exploit the variation created by the Child Care Tax Credit. They estimate a maximum
likelihood model that incorporates the probability that an individual's choices rest on any
particular segment of that budget constraint.
Some studies use only geographic variation in the costs of child care. Methodologically
these studies are quite similar to those described earlier that estimate probit models including
sample selection corrected predictions of child care costs and wages; the obvious difference is
that the child care cost varies only by location of residence and not across individuals.
The final methodological approach examines the impact of events that exogenously
separate women into different child care cost categories, called natural experiments, and then
compare employment patterns across the different groups. For instance, Berger and Black (1992)
consider differences in employment between two groups of low-income women in Kentucky, one
of whom is enrolled in a program that provides subsidized day care and the other group that is on
a waiting list for the program. Because both groups have at least attempted to enroll in the
program, one could argue that they must have similar observable and unobservable
characteristics. A second natural experiment, studied by Gelbach (1997), examines employment
of single mothers whose five-year old children differ by their quarter of birth. Because public
17schools effectively provide fully-subsidized day care, mothers of children born just before a
school's enrollment cut-off date should be more likely to work in the year their child turned five
compared to mothers whose children were born just after that date.
All of these research designs contain potential weaknesses. The sample selection
correction techniques employed by most studies require for proper identification variables that
are related to an individual's decision to work, but unrelated to potential wages or child care
costs. Similarly, in order for the final probit to be identified, there must be variables related to
potential child care costs that are not independently related to the employment decision.
Different studies take different approaches to this issue, with many of the decisions seeming very
ad hoc, at best)5 Those papers that estimate structural models encounter additional difficulties in
that a number of functional form assumptions need to be made that may or may not accurately
reflect individual behavior. Perhaps the well-conceived natural experiments provide the
strongest methodology, but their results, based on low-income women in Kentucky and single
mothers of five-year olds, cannot necessarily be generalized to the entire population of mothers
with children.
Bearing in mind these potential weaknesses, these studies do virtually uniformly find a
negative relationship between child care costs and maternal employment, regardless of the
econometric technique. Nevertheless, as can be seen in Table 5,therange of estimated
employment elasticities with respect to a change in the cost of child care across studies is rather
'5me importance of these decisions is underscored by Kimmel (1998), who concludes that most of the difference
between the highest and lowest elasticity estimates using this methodology can be attributed to the specific
explanatory variables included in the model. In performing this sensitivity analysis to determine the factors that
underlie the difference in estimated elasticities reported by Connelly (1992) and Ribar (1992), she dismisses the
importance of the type of probit (bivariate or univariate) used for the selection correction and the metric used for the
child care cost measure.
18large, ranging from just over zero to almost one. There does seem to be some clustering of
estimates around an elasticity of about -0.3 to -0.4 or so.'6 However, the papers taking a
structural approach are uniformly on the low end of the estimates, between 0 and -0.1. Aside
from the methodological differences discussed above, some studies use data on all mothers,
while others use single mothers, and still others concentrate on married mothers. Some focus on
mothers in low-income families. Some restrict their analysis to women with pre-school age
children (under age 6), while others include women with children up to age 15. Under these
circumstances, pinning down the specific factors that generate the discrepancies across studies is
virtually impossible. Additionally, none of the existing studies focus directly on differences
across skill levels, the key issue for this study. Thus, in the next section we perform our own
econometric analysis using the pooled SIPP data described earlier, with an eye toward both
evaluating the overall stability of the estimates and investigating the effect of skill level.
V. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS USING 1990 -1993SIPP DATA
For our econometric analysis, we employ the most common methodological approach
used in this literature, a probit model relating maternal employment to wages and child care
costs, controlling for sample selection problems. In order to specify the estimating equations,
one must first consider what the underlying structural equations look like. There are four such
underlying equations: a wage equation, a market price of care equation, a conditional use of paid
care equation, and a labor force participation equation. As discussed in more detail below,
t6Cleveland, Gunderson and Hyatt (1996) find a similar elasticity of -0.39 for married mothers of pre-schoolers in
Canada.
19reduced form versions of these latter two are necessary for estimating selection corrected
versions of the former two. It is then the labor force participation equation that provides us with
estimates of the elasticity with respect to child care costs, as measured by the market price. Note
that in measuring costs in this way, we directly estimate the policy-relevant concept of the overall
response to a subsidized price of child care.
The basic approach starts by specifying the wage equation as a function of human capital
variables and labor market characteristics. Similarly, the market price of care is specified as a
function of demographic characteristics thought to influence the type of care chosen and child
care market characteristics. The probability of using paid care is expected to be a function of
similar demographics reflecting preferences, variables representing availability of unpaid options,
and the market price of care. Finally, labor force participation is modeled as a function of
variables capturing nonmarket opportunities, demographics that may reflect preferences for labor
versus leisure, the market wage, and the market price of care. While the exact specification
varies by study, all follow this basic approach. We obtain our specification by beginning with
the reasonably parsimonious specification used in GAO (1994), and altering it somewhat to
reflect the available data and our judgment about appropriate variables.
Starting then with our specification of the wage equation, the model underlying our
estimates is:
(1)ln(hourly wage) =f(race,education, age, age2, marital status, number of children, urban
status, region, disability status, state unemployment rate, year).
Compared to GAO (1994), we first switch from experience and experience squared to age and
age squared. Since GAO measured experience simply as age minus education minus 6, this is
20not a large change. To better capture likely work experience, we add a variable for number of
children to account for the possibility that time has been spent out of the market. We also add an
indicator for if the mother has a health problem. This can proxy for both lost time due to health
problems and restrictions on the types ofjobs that can be done. We also add the unemployment
rate in the state in that year, to capture the tightness of the labor market.'7 Finally, we add year
dummies to account for any other changes in the wage structure over the time period.
Our specification of the market price of care equation, which incorporates some slightly
more significant changes to the GAO model, is as follows:
(2)ln(market price of child care per hour worked) =f(numberof children under 6, number of
children age 6 to 12, presence of older children, presence of an adult other than self or
spouse, presence of an unemployed adult, other family income, age, education, marital
status, urban status, region, year).
In this case, we first switch the dependent variable from price of care per week to the log of the
price of care per hour worked. We also switch from an indicator for the presence of additional
income beyond own and spouse's earnings, to the amount of that other income. We then add
age, as it may correlate with a preference for different types of care. Additionally, older mothers
may be less likely to have parents that are viable child care providers. We also add an indicator
for whether an unemployed adult is in the household (this is in addition to the indicator for any
other adult). By contrast, the GAO report uses this variable only in the probability of paid care
equation. However, the labor force status of the adult may impact both the availability of such an
adult to provide child care, and how much (if any) is paid for that care. Recall that for close to
'7mis requires dropping the small states that are not separately identified in the SIPP.
2128 percent of the children in relative care, that care is paid for. Year dummies are added to
account for any other changes in the child care market over the time period.
A participation equation is important both for the final estimates and for creating
selection correction terms for the wage and cost of care estimates. Our equation is:
(3)P(in labor force) =f(ln(hourlywage), ln(hourly market price of child care), other family
income, number of children under 6, number of children age 6 to 12, age, marital status,
education, disability status, urban status, state maximum AFDC benefits),
where again we have made some significant alterations to the GAO model. First, we add other
family income (as above) and maximum AFDC benefits for a family of 3 in the state in that year
to capture nonlabor market income opportunities. We also add the indicator for if the mother has
a health problem, since such problems can interfere with market work. Finally, we add age and
education, to proxy for cohort and peer group differences in the propensity to work.
Although we do not estimate a structural use of paid care equation, it is useful to specify
one before turning to the reduced form version necessary for the selection model. Our
specification is:
(4)P(pay for child care using child care) =f(ln(hourlywage), ln(hourly market price of
child care), presence of older children, presence of an adult other than self or spouse,
presence of an unemployed adult, race, age, education, marital status).
Essentially, we assume here that presence of potential care-givers will be important, and that age,
education and race may be correlated with preferences for formal versus informal care. Based on
these specifications, we obtain the following reduced form equations:
22(5)P(inlabor force) =f(race,education, age, age2, marital status, number of children, urban
status, region, disability status, state unemployment rate, year, number of children under
6, number of children age 6 to 12, presence of older children, presence of an adult other
than self or spouse, presence of an unemployed adult, urban status, other family income,
state maximum AFDC benefits),
(6)P(pay for child care) =f(race,education, age, age2, marital status, number of children,
urban status, region, disability status, state unemployment rate, year, number of children
under 6, number of children age 6 to 12, presence of older children, presence of an adult
other than self or spouse, presence of an unemployed adult, other family income).
Equation (5)isthen used to construct a selection correction term that is included in wage
equation (1). A bivariate probit is used to jointly estimate (5)and(6) to obtain two separate
selection correction terms that are included in the market price of care equation (2). The
predicted wage and predicted market price of care are then used in equation (3) to estimate the
effect of child care costs on labor force participation.
Thus, the selection correction model used to predict the wage is identified by excluding
number of children under 6, number of children age 6 to 12, presence of older children, presence
of an adult other than self or spouse, presence of an unemployed adult, other family income, state
maximum AFDC benefits and the state unemployment rate from the wage equation. Similarly,
the selection correction model for the market price of child care is identified by excluding the
state unemployment rate, the state maximum AFDC benefits, the total number of children,
disability status, and age squared from the cost of care equation. At the same time, the effect of
the wage is identified in the final probit due to the exclusion of race, region, year, total number of
23children, the state unemployment rate, and age squared from the structural probit. Similarly, the
cost of care is identified by excluding presence of older children, presence of an adult other than
self or spouse, presence of an unemployed adult, region and year from the structural probit)8
While not everyone may agree with the choices made, it does appear to result in a relatively
stable model, as detailed below, much more so than does the GAO specification upon which it is
based.
The stability of our model compared to the GAO specification is investigated in Table 6.
For this stability check, we first estimate the baseline specifications just described on the full
sample of all mothers with children under the age of 13. These specifications are shown as
model (1) in Table 6. We then make a series of small changes to the specifications. Model (2)
changes the bivariate selection model used in the prediction of the price of child care to a simple
univariate selection model based only on the use of paid care. Maintaining the univariate
selection, model (3) measures the price of child care as the level of the price per hour worked,
while model (4) measures it as the level of the weekly price. These changes represent the main
types of alternatives represented by the past literature.
In the top panel, we see that across all models, our specification leads to elasticities with
respect to the market price of child care of between -0.3 and -0.5, which is a relatively tight
range. By contrast, the bottom panel presents estimates of this elasticity which range from about
0 to -0.7. As was the case with Kimmel (1998), the switch to the univariate selection does not
'8A typical identification strategy is to rely on state child care regulations. We have estimated comparable models to
those reported here that include state fixed effects (rather than regional effects), which would subsume any
differences across states in the types of child care regulations that have been used to identify other models. The
results from these model specifications were very similar to those reported here.
24seem to effect the estimates very much. The small changes in the way the cost of child care is
measured are more important, though, especially in the bottom panel. This divergence of the
estimates seems to underscore the importance of carefully thinking through the specification and
associated identifying assumptions. Overall, then, these results are very supportive of Kimmel's
(1998) findings on the sources of variation in the past estimates. The table also presents the
estimated elasticities with respect to the wage, which are generally more stable. This increased
stability likely reflects both that the changes were focused on the price of care variable, and that
selection-corrected wage equations are quite standard in the literature, leading to more agreement
on proper specification.
Given that it is likely easier to obtain stable estimates of the wage elasticity, it is worth
considering the relationship between the wage and cost of child care elasticities. Clearly, an
increase in the cost of child care per hour worked can be viewed as analogous to a wage cut.
However, this does not actually imply that the negative value of the wage elasticity should be
comparable to the elasticity of employment to price of child care, but rather that the pure
behavioral response to a dollar for dollar change in the wage and in the actual amount paid for
care will be equal. That is, that3W t5C, wherePf is the probability of labor force
participation, w is the wage, and c is the cost of care actually paid for. Recall, though, that we
have measured the policy-relevant response of a change in the market price, not this behavioral
response. Thus, we measure ,wherem is the market price of care, arid, ifis the
25probability of using paid care, then c =m*Por m =cIP. AssumingP, to be constant implies
____ c9P
5'cPc9m ôn that and thus that .Finally,since a given dollar increase
in the cost of care is not the same percentage change as that same dollar change in the wage, one
must take into account the ratio of the cost to the wage. Thus, with the proper additional
information, the behavioral wage elasticity can be used to predict the policy-relevant elasticity




makingit possible to compare the response implied by our estimated child care elasticities with
the response implied by our estimated wage elasticities.
Having chosen a relatively stable model to work with, we now turn to an investigation of
the effect of child care cost on labor force participation, with a focus on differences across skill
groups. We also examine differences across skill level within several subgroups, defined by
marital status, age of child and family poverty status, the categories previously examined in the
literature. In every case, though, the prediction of the wage and market care price are estimated
using the full sample of women with children under age 13.' Only the final probit is estimated
19me results from this prediction stage are shown in the Appendix.
26separately by subgroup, by skill.20 Tables 7, 8 and 9 present the results from these final probit
model estimations. In all cases, the table presents the derivative obtained from the probit
estimates, along with the elasticity of participation, with respect to both the market price of child
care per hour worked and to the hourly wage. Also shown is the price of care elasticity implied
by the estimated wage elasticity, calculated as in (7) above, using the average predicted
probability of paying for child care, market price of care and wage. We refer to this measure as
the alternate care elasticity.
Table 7 presents results for all women with children under 13, by education and marital
status. Looking first at the top panel, we see that there is a significantly negative estimated effect
of child care cost on the labor force participation of these women. As expected, there is also a
significantly positive effect of the wage. Overall, we estimate an elasticity of participation with
respect to the market price of care to be -0.358, similar to the central tendency of the past results.
Looking across skill groups, the least skilled are slightly more responsive to the child care price,
with an elasticity of -0.394, than the most skilled, with an elasticity of -0.293. The high school
graduates are in-between, at -0.3 28. A similar pattern can be seen in terms of the wage elasticity,
where responsiveness declines with skill. Here the decline is much more steep, going from
0.9 12, to 0.447 to 0.427. These estimated wage elasticities imply alternate care elasticities that
decline from -0.103, to -0.044 to -0.040 across the skill groups, and an elasticity of -0.055
overall.
20Preliminary estimates indicated that the stability of the model suffered with smaller sample sizes when the
predictions were done separately for each subgroup. For samples with about 5000 observations or more, however,
the results were similar to those presented here.
27Thus, while the pattern of decline by skill group is similar for the alternate care
elasticities, the levels are very different. In this case, the elasticities are down at the bottom of
the range of estimates in the past literature. There are several possible explanations for this
finding. One is simply that, in fact, individuals do not respond to changes in the cost of child
care as merely a change in the net wage.2' It seems unlikely, though, that this explains the entire
disparity. Another possibility is that for those not currently using care, unobserved attributes
(such as a lack of near-by relatives) may make access to unpaid care much less likely than would
be predicted based on observed attributes. In this case, our predicted probability of using paid
care will be underestimated, and hence our alternate care elasticities will be underestimated.
However, even if we assume that the probability of using paid care is one, the effect implied by
the wage elasticity will still be well below the directly estimated effect. For example, in the case
of all women with children under 13, this upper bound on the alternate care elasticity is -0.1 5922
An alternative explanation involves the source of identification for the model.
Differences in child care costs across region are one of the main sources of variation leading to
identification of our model. It may be the case, however, that regional differences in child care
prices reflect more general differences in consumer prices and, thus, in other work-related
expenses. For a given wage, then, a dollar increase in the cost of child care may represent much
21We feel fairly confident that our wage elasticity estimates are reasonable. Ribar (1992) reports a wage elasticity of
between 0.58 and 0.68 for the married women in his child care study. Studies of the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) find elasticities of between 0.35 and 0.70 for single parents (Dickert, Houser and Scholz, 1995), and of about
0.29 for married women with less than a high school education (Eissa and Hoynes, 1998). Also, there is evidence
that participation is the main margin of adjustment for labor supply, implying that the labor force participation
elasticity may be close to the overall labor supply elasticity (See Mroz (1987), for example).
22Given the predicted probabilities of using paid care, the upper bound estimates are generally two to three times the
size of the alternative care elasticities presented here.
28more than a dollar decrease in the net wage, since it correlates with many other increased work-
related expenses. If this is the case, then our calculated elasticities will clearly overstate the
effect of a change only in the price of care.23 Most of the studies reviewed in Table 5 using this
methodology also rely on geographic variation in one form or another. It is perhaps not
surprising, then, that the smallest effects are found in studies estimating structural models. Note
that it is typical in such models to begin with the assumption that women respond to the net
return to hours worked. Overall, then, the two elasticities are probably best viewed as providing
a range of estimates. This range is toward the lower end of that provided by the past literature.
In any case, it seems clear that the responsiveness of labor force participation to price incentives
is decreasing in skill-level for women with children under age 13.
Within marital status groups, only for the unmarried women does the directly estimated
price of care elasticity decline with skill level, falling from -0.688 to -0.408 to -0.232. For the
married women, the smallest elasticity, -0.168, is estimated for the least skilled, with the other
two groups having elasticities of about -0.3. However, the alternate care elasticities derived from
wage elasticities imply that responsiveness declines with skill for both married and unmarried
women. In both cases, this decline is relatively sharp, although the move from -0.104 to -0.047
to -0.039 for married women is slightly smoother then that from -0.097 to -0.034 to -0.033 for
the unmarried women.
23Primae facie evidence for this proposition is found by re-estimating our model including regional controls in the
probit model for all women with children under 13. The weak identification leads to a fairly imprecise coefficient on
the price of child care of -0.063, with a standard error of 0.046. This much lower point estimate implies a care
elasticity of -0.104. The wage coefficient is essentially unaffected, implying an alternate care elasticity of -0.058.
29Comparing across marital status groups, we see that unmarried women, with an elasticity
of -0.473, appear more sensitive to the price of care than do married women, who have an
estimated elasticity of -0.303. This pattern is also maintained for the lower skill groups, although
for the most skilled the married women are slightly more responsive. Overall, there is very little
difference by marital status in the alternate care elasticity implied by the wage elasticity, at -0.052
and -0.055 for the married and unmarried women, respectively. When looking by skill level,
though, while the estimates remain close, if anything it is the married women for whom the
elasticities are slightly larger. The opposite is generally true for the directly calculated
elasticities, where only for the most skilled women is it the case that the care elasticity is not
larger for the married women.
Table 8 repeats the estimates of Table 7, but limits the sample only to women with at
least one child under the age of 6. Overall, the results are quite similar, although the smaller
sample leads to somewhat larger standard errors. The directly estimated elasticity with respect to
the market price of care is -0.511 for all women with children under 6, slightly higher than
before. Similarly, the alternate care elasticity of -0.089 is also slightly larger than was found for
all women with children under 13. Both overall and by marital status, the care elasticity is
generally declining with skill, whether calculated directly or from the wage elasticity. Similar to
the results in Table 7, the pattern by marital status is less clear. In general, the main findings of
Table 7 are robust to this change in sample.
Since the sample change does not seem very important, Table 9 returns to the full sample
of all women with children under 13, but focuses on differences by both skill and family income
level. We separate the sample into two groups, the non-poor, defined as women in families with
30incomes at least 185 percent above the poverty line, and the poor and near-poor, defined as
women in families with incomes less than 185 percent above the poverty line.24 Starting with the
non-poor, the directly estimated care elasticity is -0.186 overall, somewhat smaller than was
found for all women in Table 7. The alternate care elasticity of -0.034 is similarly smaller.
While this alternate care elasticity is largest for the least skilled group, the directly calculated
care elasticity reveals the opposite pattern. However, given the small number of non-poor
women with less than a high school education, the care elasticity for this group is very
imprecisely estimated, making it difficult to draw clear conclusions.
Turning to the bottom panel, the estimated care elasticity for the poor and near-poor is
larger than it was for the non-poor, at -0.375. The same is not true for the alternate care
elasticity, which at -0.032 is similar to that for the non-poor. There is very little difference in
either elasticity across the two higher skill groups, although both the care and wage elasticities
are fairly imprecisely estimated for these groups. For the least skilled group, the care elasticities,
-0.649 when directly calculated, or -0.051 when calculated from the wage elasticity, are much
larger than for the higher skill groups. Thus, the general finding of the least skilled being most
responsive to the market price of child care appears to hold even within this lower income group.
In order to put all of the previous results into context, Table 10 presents a simulation for
selected groups of women of a fifty cent drop in the per hour market price of child care. Note
that this is equivalent to an annual subsidy of about $1,000 for a full-time, full-year worker using
24Separating out the poor from the near-poor leads to relatively small sample sizes by skill group, and to very
imprecise estimates. Even within these broader groups sample sizes of less educated, nonpoor and more educated,
poor and near poor are quite small and regression coefficients for these groups are estimated with a great deal of
imprecision. This likely explains the opposite sign on the point estimate of the care elasticity than one would expect
for nonpoor women with less than a high school degree.
31paid child care. Obviously, larger subsidies would have larger effects, but recall that the average
low-skill woman using paid care only spends about $2,962 annually on child care.25 Thus, this
does imply a subsidy of at least one-third of the cost of child care for the least-skilled women.26
The table also presents the results of simulating an equivalent change in the wage. This change
is calculated by multiplying the fifty cent drop in the market price by the predicted probability of
using paid care. Reflecting the smaller alternate care elasticities calculated from the wage
elasticities, the simulated increase in participation from a 50centdrop in the price of care is
larger than that from an equivalent increase in the wage. Looking first at all women with
children under 13, our estimated model implies that a fifty cent drop in the price of care increases
the participation rate from 0.608 to 0.687, a jump of almost 8 full percentage points. By contrast,
the equivalent increase in the wage results in just a 1 percentage point increase, to 0.61 8.27
Looking across skill levels, the absolute increases in participation are fairly similar across
the groups. Thus, the sharp decline in the elasticities with skill are mainly the result of the lower
initial participation rates for the lower skill mothers. For the simulations based on the change in
the price of care, this absolute increase is often relatively large for the least skilled group. Take,
for example, the case of unmarried women with children less than 6 with less than a high school
education, a likely welfare population. Table 10 indicates that this subsidy could possibly
increase their participation by over a third, from 0.249 to 0.334. This increase is as large or
25This is obtained from Table 1 as the per week cost for those paying, $56.96, multiplied by 52.
26Simulatinga subsidy that is much larger than this would imply using our model to estimate far out of sample, and
would likely be unwise.
27Assuming that the probability of using paid care is one (i.e. simulating a 50 cent increase in the wage), implies a
change in participation between the two presented, but typically still well below that for a 50 cent decrease in the
market price of care. For example, for all women with children under 13, a 3 percentage point increase is implied.
32larger than is typically found in "successful" welfare-to-work programs (U.S. DOL, 1995) and
would suggest that child care subsidies may be a good way to increase rates of labor market entry
among welfare recipients.
What do these results tell us about the wisdom of expanding child care subsidies as a
means of assisting less-skilled women enter the labor market in the wake of welfare reform? If
higher subsidies have the potential to increase labor force participation as much as the best
previously attempted welfare-to-work programs, then perhaps more money should flow in that
direction. Several important caveats are required before such a strong conclusion could be drawn
based on our results.28 First, and perhaps most important, our simulations suggest that even after
the subsidy about two-thirds of these women remain out of the labor force even after subsidizing
care, which would be insufficient to meet the work participation requirements and time limit
provisions imposed by welfare reform. Child care constraints are apparently just a small part of
the difficulties faced by these women in the labor market. In addition, one may prefer to base
estimates of the predicted response to a child care subsidy on the broader measure of changes in
the returns to work, the wage elasticity. This approach provides considerably less optimistic
predictions, indicating that the labor force participation rate of these women would only increase
by one percentage point to 0.260 from 0.249. Moreover, past attempts to increase labor force
participation of welfare recipients through more traditional welfare-to-work strategies have never
been combined with the size of the stick that welfare reform threatens. Gauging the impact of
280ne issue that often arises in the analysis of government subsidy programs is the extent to which funding goes to
those who would have undertaken the intended behavior anyway. Although this concern emerges here as well, it is
perhaps not quite as important as it is in other contexts. For instance, while it is true that a mother who would have
worked anyway may receive a child care subsidy, she may use these additional funds to purchase higher quality child
care that is more expensive. Therefore, estimating the magnitude of the inefficiency is more complicated in the
specific case of a child care subsidy.
33such policies based on earlier demonstrations may not be so wise. At best, one might reasonably
conclude that child care subsidies can help as part of a bundle of services to get welfare
recipients into the labor market.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
As the employment levels of women with children has rapidly risen over the past several
decades, the importance of child care as a labor market issue has emerged as well. In this study
we have focused on this intersection of child care and mothers in the labor market, with an eye
toward examining differences across skill groups. Most government expenditure programs
aimed at providing child care assistance, most notably the Child Care and Development Fund
block grant program, are geared at low income families, many of whom will be made up of low-
skill workers. The main government tax program, the Child Care Tax Credit, is used most
extensively by families from the middle to upper range of the income distribution, though, where
the least skilled workers are less likely to be found.
The least skilled workers who use child care are less likely to pay for this care, and to pay
less for it when they do pay. Nonetheless, as a percentage of income, this group pays more for
child care, even when the youngest child is of school age. However, children of the least skilled
mothers are about twice as likely as children of the most skilled to be cared for by a relative.
Again, this is true across age groups, even for school age children, who are less likely to be
mainly at school during the mother's work hours. The youngest children are mainly less likely to
be in family-based or organized day care, while pre-schoolers are mainly less likely to be in
34nursery school or organized day care. It is the case, though, that when using relative care, the
least-skilled are more likely to pay for it.
An important component of this study was to investigate the effect of child care costs on
the employment of mothers. The past literature on this subject has been mixed, a result we
attribute mainly to differences in the choices made in identifying the price of care effect in the
final participation probit. These past estimates of the elasticity of participation with respect to
the price of child care range from about 0 to almost -1, and provide no information on differences
across skill level. Similarly, while most demonstration projects with a child care component are
aimed at low-skill mothers, the results are difficult to interpret with respect to child care costs,
although they appear to imply small effects. Our econometric results narrow the likely range of
elasticities for all women with children under 13 to between -0.055 to -0.35 8. Additionally, we
consistently find that this elasticity is larger for less skilled workers and declines with skill.
One must keep in mind, however, that there are inherent weaknesses to all of the
econometric methods. A well-designed and well-executed child care demonstration project, or a
broader project that was carefully designed to allow the effect of the child care component to be
separately identified would likely add significantly to our knowledge of this issue. Until then,
our results indicate that the effect of child care costs on the labor supply of women as a whole is
modest. For some groups, though, most notably less skilled unmarried women with young
children, who are likely welfare recipients, child care subsidies could possibly lead to large
relative gains. Nevertheless, their labor force participation would still remain far below that of
other groups, indicating significant additional obstacles to employment remain, and far below the
levels prescribed by the recently enacted welfare reform legislation. While we believe that
35reducing the cost of child care for these women will help meet the goals of welfare reform, it will
be insufficient on its own and other types of policies will be required as well to meet those goals.
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 Table 1: Fraction Paying for Child Care and Amount Paid Relative to Family Income
for Mothers using Care, by Education and Marital Status of Mother
Overall<HighSchool High School >HighSchool
All, Youngest Child <13
Number of Observations 14,529 1,800 5,188 7,541
Percent Paying for Care 38.4 29.6 35.2 42.7
If Pay, Dollars Paid per Week 63.43 56.96 56.02 68.76
If Pay, Percent of Income Paid 7.0 10.4 7.5 6.5
All, Youngest Child <6
Number of Observations 7,842 1,029 2,655 4,158
PercentPayingforCare 56.5 43.7 53.8 61.3
If Pay, Dollars Paid per Week 69.20 61.21 61.06 75.23
If Pay, Percent of Income Paid 7.7 10.94 8.2 7.2
Married, Youngest Child <13
Number of Observations 10,505 992 3,648 5,865
Percent Paying for Care 38.4 27.9 34.2 42.8
If Pay, Dollars Paid per Week 66.01 59.43 56.64 76.47
If Pay, Percent of Income Paid 6.3 8.5 6.4 6.1
Married, Youngest Child <6
Number of Observations 5,773 524 1,872 3,377
Percent Paying for Care 57.8 45.6 54.3 61.5
If Pay, Dollars Paid per Week 71.17 63.14 61.08 77.08
If Pay, Percent of Income Paid 6.9 9.0 7.1 6.7
Unmarried, Youngest Child <13
Number of Observations 4,024 808 1,540 1,676
PercentPayingforCare 38.3 31.6 37.5 42.5
If Pay, Dollars Paid per Week 56.49 54.39 54.61 58.83
If Pay, Percent of Income Paid 11.1 13.9 11.9 9.9
Unmarried, Youngest Child <6
Number of Observations 2069 505 783 781
PercentPayingforCare 52.7 41.8 52.7 60.4
If Pay, Dollars Paid per Week 62.93 59.16 61.00 66.50
If Pay, Percent of Income Paid 12.9 14.5 13.6 11.8
Notes: Amount paid is in 1993 dollars and includes all amounts paid for either primary or secondary
child care arrangements for all children in the family under age 15. All figures are calculated based
on weighted number of mothers. Data come from four different panels of the SIPP (1990 wave 3,
1991 wave 3, 1992 wave 6 and 1993 wave 3). Weights in the 1992 and 1993 panels are adjusted so
that the pooled panels represent the fall 1993 population.Table 2: Distribution of Child's Primary Care Arrangement,
by Education and Marital Status of Mother
Overall <HighSchool High School >HighSchool
All Children <13
School 53.4% 48.0% 53.6% 54.5%
OrganizedDayCare 7.7 5.6 6.8 8.8
Family-Based Day Care 7.4 5.9 7.2 7.8
Relative Care 12.9 22.9 13.3 10.1
Parent 15.2 13.6 16.1 15.0
In-Home Care 2.5 3.0 1.8 2.8
Other 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0
Number of Observations 23,167 2,952 8,166 12,049
All Children <6
School 17.6% 14.4% 15.7% 19.6%
Organized Day Care 16.4 11.3 15.1 18.6
Family-Based Day Care 14.9 10.5 15.5 15.6
Relative Care 22.7 38.3 24.6 17.5
Parent 23.6 20.1 25.5 23.2
In-Home Care 4.6 5.3 3.2 5.4
Other 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3
Number of Observations 10,073 1,374 3,375 5,324
Children <6,Married Mother
School 17.6% 16.6% 15.4% 18.9%
Organized Day Care 16.1 9.1 14.6 18.1
Family-BasedDayCare 14.8 11.0 14.4 15.6
Relative Care 18.1 27.2 20.3 15.4
Parent 28.8 31.2 32.4 26.4
In-Home Care 4.3 4.7 2.5 5.3
Other 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3
Number of Observations 7,582 729 2,436 4,417
Children <6, Unmarried Mother
School 17.5% 12.0% 16.49% 23.0%
Organized Day Care 17.4 13.7 16.6 21.2
Family-Based Day Care 15.2 9.9 18.6 15.5
Relative Care 37.0 50.3 35.9 28.2
Parent 7.1 8.0 7.1 6.4
In-Home Care 5.6 6.0 5.2 5.7
Other 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
Number of Observations 2,491 645 939 907
Notes: School includes nursery school and school-based activities. All distributions calculated based
on weighted number of children. Data come from four different panels of the SIPP (1990 wave 3,
1991 wave 3, 1992 wave 6 and 1993 wave 3). Weights in the 1992 and 1993 panels are adjusted so


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 5: Summary of Selected Previous Research Estimating Elasticity of Employment to Child Care Costs
Reference Methodology Data Population Estimated
Employment
Elasticity
INDIVIDUAL VARIATION IN CHILD CARE COSTS
Averett, et al. (1997) ML estimates of kinked 1986 wave of the NationalMarried women between -0.78
budget constraint model Longitudinal Survey of the ages of2l and 29 with
(Hausman 1981) Youth children under age 6
Connelly (1992) Probit model with sample Wave 5 of 1984 SIPP panelMarried women between -0.20
selection corrections (winter 1984-85) the ages of2l and 55 with
children under 13
Government Accounting Probit model with sample 1990 National Child Care All mothers with at least -0.50 (poor)
Office (1994) selection corrections Survey one child under age 13 -0.34 (near poor)
-0.19 (non-poor)
Kimmel (1995) Probit model with sample Wave 6 of the 1987 SIPP Single mothers in poverty -0.35
selection corrections Panel and Wave 3 of the
1988 SIPP panel (7/88 -
12/88)
Kimmel (1998) Probit model with sample Wave 6 of the 1987 SIPP Single and married mothers -0.22 (single)
selection corrections (7/88-12/88) with children under age 13 -0.92 (married)
Michalopoulos, et al. Estimation of structural Wave 5 of 1984 SIPP panelSingle and married mothers 0.00 for both
(1992) model (Winter 1984-85) with children less than age married and
18 single mothers
Ribar (1992) Probit model with sample Wave 5 of 1984 SIPP panelMarried women with -0.74
selection Corrections (Winter 1984-85) children underage 15
Ribar (1995) Estimation of structural Wave 5 of 1984 SIPP panelMarried women with -0.07 to -0.09
model (Winter 1984-85) children under age 15
GEOGRAPHIC VARIATION IN CHILD CARE COSTS
Blau and Robins (1988) Probit model with sample Employment Opportunity Married women under age -0.38
selection corrections Pilot Projects 1980 Survey45 with one child under age
14
Han and Waldfogel (1998)Probit model with samplc 1991-1994 March CPS Single and married mothers -0.31 (single)
selection corrections with children under age 6 -0.21 (married)
NATURAL EXPERIMENTS
Berger and Black (1992) Probit model with sample telephone survey Unmarried child care not available
selection corrections subsidy recipients and
those on waiting list in
Kentucky
Gelbach (1997) IV model using child's 1980 Census (5% sample) Single mothers age 50 and -0.13 to -0.36
quarter of birth as under with one five-year
_______________—- instrument old childTable 6: Test of the Stability of Alternative Estimates of the
Effect of the Market Price of Child Care andWageson Labor Force Participation,
All Women with Children Under 13












ln(hourly wage) 0.347 0.367 0.400
(0.026) (0.027) (0.029)
[0.572] [0.604] [0.660]





















Notes: Models are estimated using a probit model, but marginal effects are shown, along with standard errors in
parentheses. Elasticities are shown in brackets. All models in the top panel also include other family income, number
of children under 6, number of children age 6 to 12, age, education, marital status, disability status, urban status, and state
maximum AFDC benefits. All models in the bottom panel also include number of children under 6, number of children
age 6 to 12, race, marital status, and urban status. Predictions of the cost of child care and of the wage also differ across
panels, see the text for details. Model (1) is the base model, with the cost of child care measured as the log of the price
per hour worked. Model (2) changes the bivariate selection model used to predict the price of child care to a univariate
selection model. In addition to this, model (3) measures cost of child care as the level of the price per hour worked, while
model (4) measures the cost as the level of the weekly price.Table 7: Estimates of the Effect of the Market Price of
Child Care and Wages on Labor Force Participation,
by Education and Marital Status for All Women with Children Under 13
ALL WOMEN
All <High SchoolHigh School>HighSchool
ln(hourly wage) 0.347 0.328 0.276 0.3 00
(0.026) (0.045) (0.044) (0.046)
ln(market price of care) -0.2 17 -0.142 -0.202 -0.205
(0.033) (0.076) (0.052) (0.047)
wage elasticity 0.572 0.9 12 0.447 0.427
care elasticity -0.3 58 -0.394 -0.328 -0.293
alternate care elasticity -0.055 -0.103 -0.044 -0.040
#of observations 20587 3684 8152 8751
participation rate 0.607 0.3 60 0.6 17 0.702
MARRIED WOMEN
All <High SchoolHigh School>HighSchool
ln( hourly wage) 0.336 0.402 0.306 0.274
(0.034) (0.069) (0.057) (0.056)
ln(market price of care) -0.190 -0.069 -0.190 -0.204
(0.039) (0.107) (0.062) (0.053)
wage elasticity 0.535 0.983 0.487 0.396
care elasticity -0.303 -0.168 -0.30 1 -0.296
alternate care elasticity -0.052 -0.104 -0.047 -0.039
#of observations 14895 2055 5736 7104
participation rate 0.629 0.409 0.629 0.69 1
UNMARRIED WOMEN
All <High SchoolHigh School >HighSchool
ln(hourly wage) 0.320 0.235 0.199 0.319
(0.045) (0.060) (0.074) (0.083)
ln(market price of care) -0.260 -0.205 -0.239 -0.173
(0.065) (0.107) (0.095) (0.099)
wage elasticity 0.582 0.790 0.339 0.428
care elasticity -0.473 -0.688 -0.408 -0.232
alternate care elasticity -0.055 -0.097 -0.034 -0.033
#ofobservatjons 5692 1629 2416 1647
participation rate 0.550 0.298 0.587 0.745
Notes: Models are estimated using a probit model, but marginal effects are shown, along with standard errors in
parentheses. The market price of care is measured per hour worked. The alternate care elasticity is calculated based on
the wage elasticity, predicted probability of paying for care, wage and market price of care. See text for details. All
models also include other family income, number of children under 6, number of children age 6 to 12, age, education,
marital status, disability status, urban status, and state maximum AFDC benefits.Table 8: Estimates of the Effect of the Market Price of
Child Care and Wages on Labor Force Participation,
by Education and Marital Status for All Women with Children Under 6
ALL WOMEN
All <High SchoolHigh School>HighSchool
ln( hourly wage) 0.316 0.250 0.240 0.2 19
(0.038) (0.056) (0.065) (0.074)
ln(market price of care) -0.277 -0.275 -0.269 -0.193
(0.044) (0.090) (0.070) (0.064)
wage elasticity 0.5 83 0.811 0.436 0.34 1
care elasticity -0.511 -0.891 -0.488 -0.300
alternate care elasticity -0.089 -0.145 -0.07 1 -0.050
#of observations 12458 2432 4738 5288
participation rate 0.543 0.308 0.55 1 0.642
MARRIED WOMEN
All <High SchoolHigh School>HighSchool
ln( hourly wage) 0.319 0.361 0.307 0.178
(0.05 1) (0.089) (0.088) (0.090)
ln(market price of care) -0.266 -0.342 -0.286 -0.189
(0.051) (0.131) (0.085) (0.071)
wage elasticity 0.556 0.995 0.540 0.278
care elasticity -0.463 -0.943 -0.503 -0.296
alternate care elasticity -0.085 -0.177 -0.088 -0.041
# of observations 9045 1275 3297 4473
participation rate 0.575 0.362 0.568 0.640
UNMARRIED WOMEN
All <High SchoolHigh School>HighSchool
ln( hourly wage) 0.262 0.183 0.143 0.277
(0.060) (0.075) (0.099) (0.137)
ln(market price of care) -0.267 -0.181 -0.256 -0.140
(0.083) (0.122) (0.125) (0.156)
wage elasticity 0.572 0.736 0.279 0.423
care elasticity -0.585 -0.725 -0.499 -0.2 14
alternate care elasticity -0.089 -0.132 -0.045 -0.057
#of observations 3413 1157 1441 815
participation rate 0.457 0.249 0.5 13 0.655
Notes: Models are estimated using a probit model, but marginal effects are shown, along with standard errors in
parentheses. The market price of care is measured per hour worked. The alternate care elasticity is calculated based on
the wage elasticity, predicted probability of paying for care, wage and market price of care. See text for details. All
models also include other family income, number of children under 6, number of children age 6 to 12, age, education,
marital status, disability status, urban status, and state maximum AFDC benefits.Table 9: Estimates of the Effect of the Market Price of
Child Care and Wages on Labor Force Participation
by Education and Poverty Status for All Women with Children Under 13
NON-POOR WOMEN
All <High SchoolHigh School>HighSchool
ln( hourly wage) 0.278 0.479 0.175 0.22 1
(0.033) (0.094) (0.056) (0.050)
ln(market price of care) -0.137 0.067 -0.118 -0.146
(0.037) (0.148) (0.061) (0.049)
wage elasticity 0.377 0.8 18 0.237 0.291
care elasticity -0.186 0.115 -0.160 -0.192
alternate care elasticity -0.034 -0.075 -0.02 1 -0.027
#of observations 12416 972 4604 6840
participation rate 0.738 0.586 0.738 0.759
POOR AND NEAR-POOR WOMEN
All <High SchoolHigh School>HighSchool
ln(hourlywage) 0.117 0.118 0.031 0.026
(0.038) (0.047) (0.065) (0.105)
ln(market price of care) -0.153 -0.181 -0.094 -0.112
(0.053) (0.083) (0.082) (0.113)
wage elasticity 0.287 0.422 0.068 0.053
care elasticity -0.375 -0.649 -0.205 -0.227
alternate care elasticity -0.032 -0.05 1 -0.007 -0.006
#of observations 8171 2712 3548 1911
participation rate 0.407 0.279 0.459 0.495
Notes: Models are estimated using a probit model, but marginal effects are shown, along with standard errors in
parentheses. The market price of care is measured per hour worked. The alternate care elasticity is calculated based on
the wage elasticity, predicted probability of paying for care, wage and market price of care. See text for details. All
models also include other family income, number of children under 6, number of children age 6 to 12, age, education,
marital status, disability status, urban status, and state maximum AFDC benefits. Poor and near-poor women are defined
as women with family income under 185% of the poverty line.Table 10: Simulations of the Effect of a 500 Decrease in the Per Hour Market Price
of Child Care for Selected Groups of Women, by Education
ALL WOMEN WITH CHILDREN <13
All <HSHigh School>HS
Initial predicted labor force participation0.608 0.360 0.6 17 0.702
After a 500 drop in per hour market cost0.687 0.433 0.698 0.766
After a 500*(prob pay) increase in wage0.618 0.372 0.626 0.710
UNMARRIED WOMEN WITH CHILDREN <13
All <HSHigh School>HS
Initial predicted labor force participation0.552 0.298 0.587 0.746
After a 500 drop in per hour market cost0.657 0.415 0.690 0.811
After a 500*(prob pay) increase in wage0.562 0.308 0.594 0.754
POOR AND NEAR-POOR WITH CHILDREN <13
All <HSHigh School>HS
Initial predicted labor force participation0.408 0.279 0.460 0.495
Aftera5OØ drop inperhourmarketcost0.476 0.380 0.501 0.537
After a 500*(prob pay) increase in wage 0.4 12 0.284 0.46 1 0.496
ALL WOMEN WITH CHILDREN <6
All <HS High School>HS
Initial predicted labor force participation0.543 0.309 0.552 0.643
After a 50 drop in per hour market cost0.628 0.424 0.641 0.695
Aftera500*(probpay)increaseinwage0.555 0.321 0.562 0.650
UNMARRIED WOMEN WITH CHILDREN <6
All <HS High School>HS
Initial predicted labor force participation0.459 0.249 0.5 14 0.656
Aftera5OØdropinperhourmarketcost0.555 0.334 0.608 0.701
After a 500*(prob pay) increase in wage0.470 0.260 0.520 0.666
Notes: Poor and near-poor women are defined as women with family income under 185% of the poverty line.
Simulations are based on the models estimated in Tables 7, 8 and 9. See text for details of the simulation procedure.A
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